High-Frequency Trading and Market Stability*

Dion Bongaerts† and Mark Van Achter‡

April 2014

Abstract

In recent years, technological innovations and changes in financial regulation induced a new set of liquidity providers to arise on financial markets: high-frequency traders (HFTs). HFTs differ most notably from traditional market participants in the fact that they combine speed and information processing. We compare a setting with HFTs to settings with traders that only have speed technology or only information processing technology available. Speed technology by itself will only be adopted when socially efficient. Information processing technology by itself will only generate mild inefficiencies due to a lemons problem. The combination of the two, however, can lead to the implementation of inefficient speed technology or the amplification of the lemons problem. In the latter case, liquidity evaporates when it is most needed and markets can freeze altogether for periods of time. We also discuss how regulation can prevent such sudden drops of liquidity and how the market may recover after a freeze.

JEL Codes: D53, G01, G10, G18

Keywords: High-Frequency Trading, Limit Order Book, Market Freeze, Market Stability

*We would like to thank Jean-Edouard Colliard, Hans Degryse, Frank de Jong, Thierry Foucault, Nicolae Garleanu, Terry Hendershott, Johan Hombert, Katya Malinova, Sophie Moinas, Christine ParLOUR and Ioanid Roșu for helpful comments and suggestions. Mark Van Achter gratefully acknowledges financial support from Trustfonds Erasmus University Rotterdam.

†Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University, Department of Finance, Burgemeester Oudlaan 50, P.O. Box 1738, 3000 DR Rotterdam, The Netherlands. E-mail: dbongaerts@rsm.nl.

‡Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University, Department of Finance, Burgemeester Oudlaan 50, P.O. Box 1738, 3000 DR Rotterdam, The Netherlands. E-mail: mvanachter@rsm.nl.
1 Introduction

In recent years, technological innovations and changes in financial regulation (e.g. Regulation NMS in the United States and MiFiD in Europe) have induced trading to become more automated. This development has drastically altered the nature of liquidity provision on financial markets. More specifically, traditional intermediaries have been complemented or even replaced by a new set of liquidity providers: high-frequency traders (HFTs). HFTs invest heavily in trading technology allowing them to benefit from a combination of low-latency access to the financial market (i.e., “speed”) and superior information processing. In particular, they use automated algorithms to scan (order book) information at an extremely fast rate and instantly form trading decisions. Co-location near the market server assures these decisions are transferred to the market in microseconds. In order to exploit their speed advantage as much as possible, HFTs compete for low latency amongst each other (e.g. for an optimal co-location near the market server). In parallel, trading venues have been very active in setting up policies to attract HFTs (e.g. through offering beneficial pricing policies, co-location opportunities or privileged information access mechanisms) in order to increase turnover. For 2012, HFTs were involved in an estimated 55 percent of all daily US equity trading volume and 45 percent of all daily European equity trading volume (Tabb Group, 2012).

Meanwhile, the massive participation of these new “middlemen” in trades across the globe spurred an intense public debate on the desirability of HFTs. This debate was fueled further by the May 2010 “flash crash” which featured an unprecedented vicious liquidity spiral causing US equity markets to instantly dry up and the major index to temporarily decrease by more than 9% (corresponding to $1 trillion in market value evaporating). In recent years markets allegedly have become more susceptible to technology-related incidents. Especially the increasing incidence rate of “mini flash crashes” has been linked by many market observers to the emergence of HFTs. Hence, policy makers and regulators have become increasingly concerned that HFT-based liquidity provision could come at the expense of an evaporation of liquidity when it is most

---

1 Latency refers to the total reaction time to a change in the state of the market, and can be decomposed into the time needed to acquire, process, and trade upon upon new information (see e.g. Hasbrouck and Saar, 2010).
2 Although HFTs did not trigger the flash crash, their highly-correlated responses to an initial shock contributed considerably to the severity of the drop. Furthermore, HFTs did not lose money during this crash, but in fact seem to have made more profits than on previous days. In contrast, traditional intermediaries (i.e., market makers, pension funds and mutual funds) incurred significant losses (Kirenko, Kyle, Samadi and Tuzun, 2011). See CFTC-SEC (2010), Menkveld and Yueshen (2011), and Easley, López de Prado and O’Hara (2012) for further in-depth analyses of the flash crash.
3 Mini flash crashes are abrupt and severe price changes that occur in an extremely short period. Recently-reported examples include the shares of Google on 4/22/2013 (Russolillo, 2013), of Symantec on 4/30/2013 (Vlastelica, 2013) and of Anadarko on 5/17/2013 (Nanex, 2013). Another notable example is the BATS IPO on 3/23/2012 (Beucke, 2012). See Dugast and Foucault (2013), Golub, Keane and Poon (2012) and Johnson et al. (2012) for analyses on the linkage between HFT and mini flash crashes.
needed (see e.g. CFTC-SEC (2010) and Niederauer (2012)).

This paper examines exactly that by analyzing whether or not HFTs (i) can destabilize financial markets, (ii) contribute to efficiently financing the economy in the long run, and (iii) should be regulated (and if so how). To do so, we construct a novel model of HFT liquidity provision in which potentially informed order flow arrives to a limit order market. Initially, liquidity in this market is provided by a homogeneous set of relatively slow liquidity providers (i.e., low-frequency traders, or LFTs), such as traditional market makers or institutional investors. In line with reality, we then give traders the option to become technologically more advanced by investing upfront in speed and/or superior information processing technology. Nowadays, the simultaneous investment in both technological advances (which is the setup closest to real-life HFTs) generates synergy benefits. Historically, such benefits have been much smaller or even non-existent.

To show the significance and the impact of these synergy benefits, we proceed along the following three steps. We first give traders the option to only invest in speed technology which allows to monitor the market at a lower cost. It is shown that if this technology is competitive enough (i.e., if the installation cost is low enough compared to the speed advantage it yields), the fast liquidity providers take over the whole market, while nobody adopts the new technology if it is too expensive. In a second step, we assume that instead of speed technology, only superior information processing technology is available. This technology allows its users to spot the typical indications of order flow stemming from better-informed traders (e.g. informed trade clustering as documented in Admati and Pfleiderer (1988)) better and faster. These users can use this information to avoid providing liquidity to incoming informed order flow, which will then end up with the non-users. As such, LFTs bear disproportionally large adverse selection losses when providing liquidity to “toxic order flow” (see also Biais, Foucault and Moinas (2013) and Easley, López de Prado and O’Hara (2012)). As compared to the first setting, we find that some traders will indeed invest in this technology. Interestingly though, not all LFTs will do so in equilibrium. The reason is that if too many traders adopt this technology, LFTs will leave the market. As a result, there will be no liquidity demanders to absorb informed order flow and costly market freezes would arise. These freezes

---

4our focus on HFT liquidity provision is supported by Kirilenko, Kyle, Samadi and Tuzun (2010) who find that 78% of the HFT orders in their sample (trades in the E-mini futures S&P500) are limit orders. Jovanovic and Menkveld (2011) find that the HFT they are focusing on is on the passive side of the transaction in about 78% (respectively 74%) of the transactions on which he is involved on Chi-X (respectively Euronext).

5Consider the NYSE specialist from the past as an example. If anything, analyzing data from several sources would slow down rather than speed up his market making operations. For a liquidity-providing HFT, hardware upgrades offer computing power, memory and low latency that are useful for both information processing as well as fast order routing (e.g. multi-core processing). Co-location would again yield benefits for both speedy order routing as well as superior (in this case earlier) information processing. Moreover, modern day IT infrastructure allows for unprecedented communication speeds between the information processing and trading functions of the system.
would prevent ATs from realizing informed trading profits. Therefore, the adoption rate of such technology is limited such that freezes do not occur in equilibrium. As a third step, we explore a setting in which traders can opt to invest in technology that combines speed and information superiority. The overall effect of this setting depends on whether speed technology is efficient or not.\footnote{With efficient we mean that the ratio of speed over technology cost is more favorable for ATs than for LFTs.} If speed technology is inefficient, synergy benefits between speed and information technology increase the adoption likelihood as profits from informational superiority may cross-subsidize the high speed costs. In this case, market freezes do not occur for the same reason as indicated in the second step. However, if speed technology is efficient, the gains from speed superiority may create an allowance for the costs resulting from market freezes. As a consequence, negative externalities from market freezes may prevent efficient market organization.

The resulting main insights can be summarized as follows. First, allowing LFTs to invest in speed technology only yields efficient outcomes: if the technology is too expensive, it will not be adopted and vice versa. Second, providing LFTs the option to invest in information processing technology may trigger information asymmetry problems. Yet, the severeness of these problems is limited as market freezes cannot materialize. Third, if LFTs are allowed to purchase speed and information processing technology simultaneously (i.e., become HFTs), the overall impact hinges on the efficiency (i.e. cost per unit of speed improvement) of the speed technology. If speed technology is inefficient, cross-subsidization from informational gains can nonetheless lead to its adoption. Market freezes in this case do not materialize. If, in turn, speed technology is efficient enough, adoption rates can grow so large that costly and inefficient market freezes can occur in equilibrium.

Our results indicate that in the absence or with low levels of informed trading, HFTs can improve liquidity and price discovery. More and faster HFTs reduce average transaction costs, and cause quotes to converge faster to the efficient price. These findings indeed concur with the existing empirical results that the presence of HFTs improves market quality (see e.g. Brogaard, Hendershott and Riordan (2013), Hasbrouck and Saar (2012), Hendershott, Jones and Menkveld (2011), and Malinova, Park and Riordan (2013)). However, a different storyline unfolds when suspicions of informed trading are high. In such situations, HFTs will shun the market, even when these suspicions are ex-post unfounded/incorrect (e.g. if they were induced by a fat-finger error triggering a series of market orders). In those scenarios, only the LFTs can keep the market going. If, however, LFTs have been largely pushed out of the market as described above, trading will be thin, liquidity will be low, price discovery will be slow and markets can even stop functioning altogether. As such, our model captures the potential systemic risk HFT activity brings to financial markets. While an increase in HFTs’ market share...
improves liquidity and price discovery under some market conditions, it induces market freezes to arise in equilibrium with increasing frequency under other conditions.

Our model provides insights on how financial markets should be optimally organized and regulated in the presence of HFTs. In particular, we provide insights on the impact of allowing market participants to adopt advanced speed and/or information processing technology. Moreover, we assess the effectiveness of several proposed (or implemented) regulatory measures to manage HFT activity. These include imposing a financial transaction tax, minimum latency requirements, the introduction of (contingent) make-take fees, and affirmative liquidity provisions. Those measures are shown to affect the equilibrium number of HFTs and LFTs (and as such, the aforementioned trade-off between high liquidity and low systematic risk) in different ways.

While the baseline version of the model provides valuable insights, it takes a very simplified approach to information production technology. In an extension of the model, we show how the results of our baseline model translate to a more realistic setting. To this end, we introduce a dynamic setting in which ATs can learn about informed trading in the recent past by observing the order book. If informed trading shows persistence, this information is useful in forecasting the likelihood of informed trading in the current period.

To our knowledge, no papers exist analyzing the effect of the introduction of HFTs on market stability. Taking a wider perspective, our paper is related to different sets of literature. First, our model contributes to the emerging theoretical HFT literature (e.g. Aït-Sahalia and Saglam (2013), Bernales and Daoud (2013), Biais, Foucault and Moinas (2013), Biais, Hombert and Weill (2010), Budish, Cramton and Shim (2013), Foucault, Hombert and Roşu (2013), Hoffmann (2013), Jovanovic and Menkveld (2011), Martinez and Roşu (2011), Pagnotta (2010), and Pagnotta and Philippon (2012)). In particular, our model is the first to focus on the systemic risk potentially brought to the financial market by HFT activity. That is, it allows to endogenously generate (and analyze) market freezes and relate their occurrence to the degree of speed and information-processing advantage that an investment in technology can generate. In addition, we obtain our findings in a novel framework featuring both liquidity shocks and adverse selection.

Second, our model fits into the literature modeling dynamic trading in financial markets through limit order books (e.g. Foucault, Goettler, Parlour and Rajan (2005, 2009), Foucault, Kadan and Kandel (2005), Parlour (1998) and Roşu (2009)). The limit order book setting we construct is most closely related to Cordella and Foucault (1999) who consider two symmetric dealers competing for uninformed order-flow. We

---

7This finding puts forward a new channel through which the evidence on crashes and high-frequency trading reported in Sornette and von der Becke (2011) could be understood. Moreover, it could be seen as an additional negative outcome of the HFT arms’ race documented in Biais, Foucault and Moinas (2013) and Budish, Cramton and Shim (2013).
add to this paper, and to the theoretical limit order book literature, by introducing endogenous liquidity provision by multiple liquidity providers which can be either fast (HFT) or slow (LFT), and with potentially informed incoming order flow. The few existing dynamic limit order book models which are solvable in closed-form (i.e., Foucault (1999), Foucault, Kadan and Kandel (2005), and Roşu (2009)) all abstract from informed trading.

The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the setup of our model. Section 3 presents a formal definition of the market equilibrium, and Sections 4 and 5 analyze the equilibria arising under different informational settings. Section 6 provides extensions of the model, while Section 7 presents an analysis of some regulatory measures. Section 8 concludes. Proofs are relegated to an appendix.

2 Setup

This section provides the reader with the setup of the model. For the reader’s convenience, a notational summary is included towards the end of the paper in Appendix C.

Consider a limit order book for a security with payoff \(\tilde{V}\). Given the available public information on this asset, the fundamental value of the asset equals \(\mu\). The set of possible quotes at which liquidity could be provided is discrete. The grid on which traders can post their prices is characterized by the size of the minimum price variation, \(g(z) = \frac{z^2}{2z+1}, z \in \mathbb{N}\). Note that a larger \(z\) implies a finer grid. By varying \(z\), we are able to compare equilibria obtained with different grids. A grid with a zero minimum price variation is obtained as a limiting case by taking \(z\) to infinity. From now on, when we say that the tick size is decreased, this is tantamount to an increase in \(z\). On the grid with tick size \(g(z)\), we denote by \(\langle p \rangle_z^-\) the highest price which is strictly lower than \(p\). In a similar way, on the grid with size \(g(z)\), \(\langle p \rangle_z^+\) is the lowest price which is greater than or equal to \(p\). The set of possible prices with a grid of size \(g(z)\) is \(Q_z = \{\ldots, p(-i), p(0), p(i), \ldots\}\), with \(p(i) = \langle \mu \rangle_z^- + i \cdot g(z)\) and \(p(-i) = \langle \mu \rangle_z^- - i \cdot g(z)\), \(i \in \mathbb{N}\). We assume that \(\mu - \langle \mu \rangle_0^- = \langle \mu \rangle_0^+ - \mu = \frac{g(0)}{2}\); that is, the position of the expected asset value is halfway between ticks for the grid with size \(g(0)\). It is straightforward to check that this assumption and the definition of \(g(z)\) imply that the asset expected value is always halfway between ticks for all the possible grids. We call \(p(1)\) the “competitive price”. This is the first price on the grid above \(\mu\). Furthermore, time and price priority hold on this market, and by assumption the sell limit orders submitted by LFTs or ATs expire upon being undercut.

---

\footnote{Note this assumption does not affect the results qualitatively, but merely simplifies the comparative statics between equilibria obtained with different grid sizes.}
Over time, which is continuous and is indexed by \( t \in [0, +\infty] \), market participants arrive to the market. At a random time \( \tilde{T} \) within the trading game, a liquidity demander submits a market order which respects her reservation price. This liquidity-demanding trader can be either trading out of liquidity needs, or because she has private information. Let us denote the type of liquidity demander that enters the market as a state of nature \( \zeta \in \{\text{liq, inf}\} \), where \( \text{liq} \) and \( \text{inf} \) denote the liquidity induced and the private information induced type, respectively. The unconditional probabilities of ending up in states with \( \zeta = \text{inf} \) and \( \zeta = \text{liq} \) are given by \( \bar{\pi} \) and \( 1 - \bar{\pi} \) respectively.

If \( \zeta = \text{liq} \), the liquidity-demanding trader arriving is assumed to have a rectangular demand, that is, she purchases 1 unit of the asset if the best ask price is lower than or equal to her reservation price \( p_{\text{liq}} \). By assumption, \( p_{\text{liq}} \) is positioned on the price grid. We assume that \( \tilde{T} \) is exponentially distributed with parameter \( \nu_{\text{liq}} \).

In turn, if \( \zeta = \text{inf} \), with intensity \( \nu_{\text{inf}} \) an informed trader arrives to the market at some point and submits a market order to buy the asset. She has accurate private fundamental information that \( \tilde{V} = \mu_{\text{inf}} \), where \( \mu_{\text{inf}} > p_{\text{liq}} \). By assumption \( p_{\text{liq}} \) is also her reservation price for buying the security.

There is a unit mass of risk neutral agents in the market that can choose to invest in liquidity provision technology. These agents can choose to become either of two types of liquidity providers: (i) advanced traders (ATs) that can be fast, smart or both, and (ii) low frequency traders (i.e., LFTs). In our model the fraction of agents that becomes AT is denoted by \( m \in [0, 1] \) and the fraction that becomes LFTs is denoted by \( n \in [0, 1 - m] \). Before the trading game starts, ATs and LFTs need to make fixed cost investments. More specifically, the masses of ATs and LFTs need to make an investments \( mC_A \) and \( nC_L \) respectively, which are borne equally by all constituents in each respective group. Hence, individual ATs and LFTs face cost densities of \( C_A \) and \( C_L \) respectively. These costs could be seen as a annualized costs of IT infrastructure, fees for keeping trading accounts or fees for co-location at the exchange and are incurred ex-ante. Once endogenously determined, \( m \) and \( n \) are assumed to remain constant over time throughout the trading game. Note that when \( m + n < 1 \), some traders simply choose not to participate. Moreover, as will be further explained below, during the

---

9That is, there exists \( q \in \mathbb{N} \) such that \( p_{\text{liq}} = \langle \mu \rangle_0 + qg(0) \), with \( k \geq 2 \) for the problem to be of interest. As such, the liquidity-demanding trader’s reservation price belongs to \( Q_2, \forall z \in \mathbb{N} \).

10There can be several reasons why informed traders have a reservation price that strictly falls short of the private value. One can think about limited market capacity and staged trading with price impact as in ?, the need to recoup information production costs, having noisy information in combination with risk aversion, etc.

11As such, liquidity-providers in this market always run adverse selection risk, because they cannot provide liquidity at a quote at which only the traders buying for liquidity reasons are interested.

12We consider a setting with a continuum of liquidity providers for tractability reasons. It can be derived as the limit of a discrete case where the numbers of LFTs and ATs are large.

13We will assume that the total mass of players eligible to be liquidity provider is so large that the upper bound of 1 never binds. This ensures that for \( m \) and \( n \) we either have a boundary solution at 0
trading game the four trader types differ in two other respects: (i) the magnitude of their monitoring cost (which determines the frequency at which they are able to access the market), and (ii) their processing capacity of real-time order-book information. When ATs are only fast, they have lower monitoring costs and are therefore faster, but not better informed than the LFTs. When ATs are only smart, they have superior ability to process order book information and are therefore better informed, but are not faster than LFTs. Finally, ATs that are both fast and smart are what we would classify as high-frequency traders in today’s limit order markets. Those traders are faster and better at processing information than LFTs by the virtue of their superior hardware and co-location.

Over time, liquidity-providers arrive randomly and post sell limit orders. In particular, traders arrive to the market following a Poisson process. To capture the speed advantage of advanced traders relative to LFTs, we assume that ATs have technology to monitor the market \( \gamma \) times as often as LFTs. As a result, aggregate LFT market arrival intensity equals \( n\lambda \), whereas the aggregate AT market arrival intensity is given by \( m\gamma\lambda \). By assumption, \( \gamma > 1 \) for fast and HFT advanced trader types and \( \gamma = 1 \) for smart ATs. This setup reflects the higher frequency with which fast traders and HFTs monitor the market, and also captures the greater competition for exposure if \( \gamma \) and/or \( m \) increase.

We assume that smart and HFT ATs have superior abilities to process information compared to LFTs. These divergences in monitoring capacities are captured in different information sets \( \psi_k \) available to the liquidity providers of type \( k \). In particular, for smart and HFT ATs, \( \psi_{AT} \) contains a noisy but informative signal \( s \in \{inf, liq\} \) available about the state of nature. Signals \( s = inf \) and \( s = liq \) are correct with probabilities \( \phi_1 \in (0.5, 1] \) and \( \phi_2 \in (0.5, 1] \), respectively. Let us for tractability reasons also assume that the unconditional probability of a signal \( s = inf \) equals \( \bar{\pi} \) such that signals are unbiased. In Section 6.2, we extend the model to a dynamic setting where ATs learn by observing past order flow. If states are persistent, observing past order flow allows them to forecast the current state of nature in a rather accurate way. The assumption \( P(s = inf) = \bar{\pi} \) is also consistent with this framework.

If a liquidity demander ever arrives to an empty order book, the state of nature stays the same and the liquidity demander will re-visit the market at a later time again according to the same intensity. Importantly, none of the liquidity providers can observe whether a liquidity demander has already sent a market order to an empty order book. When the trade occurs the game ends and the asset payoff \( \tilde{V} \) is realized.

The information asymmetry among liquidity providers may lead to a lemons problem or an interior solution.\(^{14}\) For brevity, we focus on the equilibrium ask prices. It is straightforward to extend the results to the case in which traders post ask and bid prices.
that is so severe that markets freeze. We assume that such freezes are particularly costly for advanced traders. Among others, this is motivated by the fact that advanced traders such as HFTs are very thinly capitalized and therefore very sensitive to increasing volatilities, margins and holding periods.

In the model, we assume that every time the market freezes, the mass of advanced traders incurs a costs \( mC_M \), to be split equally among all constituents. Hence, upon the occurrence of a freeze, ATs face an additional cost density of \( C_M \). Let us for the rest of the paper assume that the freeze costs in expectation at least offset any information advantage an AT may have:

\[
c_M \geq \phi_2(\mu_{inf} - p_{iq})
\]  

In the base case, we do not make any assumptions as to how the market unfreezes again, but in Section ?? we suggest some mechanisms for the market to unfreeze again.

3 Equilibrium

The aim of this section is to provide a formal definition of the equilibrium. First, ATs and LFT limit order placement strategies are characterized. Such a strategy is a mapping \( R_k(\cdot) \), with \( k \in \{LFT, AT\} \), from the set of possible states of the order book (i.e. standing best quote) into the set of possible offers \( Q_z \). The reaction function \( R_k(\cdot) \) provides the new price posted by a trader given the state of the order book upon arrival. If a trader is indifferent between two limit orders with different prices, we assume that she submits the limit order creating the larger spread. In a next step, we define an equilibrium of the trading game, which is a pair of order placement strategies (i.e., \( R^*_LFT \) and \( R^*_AT \)) such that each trader’s strategy is optimal given the strategies of all other traders. Finally, the equilibrium number of AT and LFT traders, set in the initial participation stage, is derived.

3.1 Traders’ Order Placement Strategies

We analyze trader \( k \)'s order placement strategy given a standing best ask quote \( \hat{a}(\tau) \) upon arrival at time \( \tau \).\(^{16}\) Assuming the time of arrival \( \tau \) is earlier than the time of arrival of the market order and given the information set \( \psi_k \), trader \( k \)'s expected profit of posting a limit order at quote \( a(\tau) \) could be depicted as follows:

\(^{15}\)We normalize freeze costs for LFTs to zero.

\(^{16}\)As by assumption all backlying sell limit orders expire upon being undercut by an order at \( \hat{a}(\tau) \), the order placement strategies depend only on this quote (and not on all the orders submitted at less aggressive quotes). As long as cancelations are impossible, this is equivalent to the case in which all orders expire at the end of each iteration.
\[
\Pi_k(a(\tau), \hat{a}(\tau), \tau) = \begin{cases} 
0 & \text{if } a(\tau) \geq \hat{a}(\tau) \\
E \left( \Phi(a(\tau), \psi_k) \cdot (a(\tau) - \tilde{V}) \right) | \psi_k & \text{if } a(\tau) = \hat{a}(\tau) - i \cdot g(z)
\end{cases}
\]

where \( i \in \mathbb{N} \), \( \Phi(a(\tau), \psi_k) \) is the trader’s expected execution probability corresponding to quote \( a(\tau) \), and \( E(\cdot | \psi_k) \) is the trader’s expectation over states of nature conditional on her information set. In particular, in each iteration the asset value may equal \( \mu \) or \( \mu_{inf} \), and traders make assessments of this value and execution probabilities based upon the information set they have upon their arrival at time \( \tau \). For both trader types, submitting an ask quote \( a(\tau) \) which is less or equally aggressive than the best quote upon arrival yields a zero expected execution probability and therefore a zero expected profit. In turn, submitting a quote which improves the best quote upon arrival by \( i \) ticks features a positive expected execution probability hinging on future arriving traders’ strategies. Noteworthy, when \( \zeta = liq \), undercutting to the competitive quote \( p(1) \) yields \( p(1) - \mu \) with certainty (i.e., \( \Phi(p(1), \psi_k) = 1 \)), as this quote can never be profitably undercut by any liquidity provider. As such, upon arrival, the traders commonly face a trade-off between a higher execution price and a higher expected execution probability.

### 3.2 Equilibrium Definition

Let \( V_k(\hat{a}(\tau), \tau) \), with \( k \in \{ AT, LFT \} \), be trader \( k \)'s expected profit given that the current best quote is \( \hat{a}(\tau) \) and the trader is about to react. \( V_k(\hat{a}(\tau), \tau) \) can be expressed as:

\[
V_k(\hat{a}(\tau), \tau) = \max_{R_k \in Q_z} \Pi_k(R_k, \hat{a}(\tau), \tau)
\]

where all traders behave according to \( R_{LFT}^* \) and \( R_{AT}^* \). Thus, both trader types account for the expected profit of their current action only (i.e., \( \Pi_k(R_k, \hat{a}(\tau), \tau) \)). As players are atomistic, the probability of arriving to the market again, given arrival now is zero.\(^{17}\)

The solutions of these dynamic programming relationships yield the optimal placement strategies, \( R_{AT}^* \) and \( R_{LFT}^* \). The expected execution probabilities of both traders types are computed assuming that traders follow these strategies. Traders’ optimal order placement strategies hinge on the expected execution probabilities. The expected execution probabilities are in turn determined by traders’ order placement strategies. The type of equilibrium we are looking for is a Nash equilibrium.

\(^{17}\)It is possible to set up the model with a discrete number of LFTs and HFTs and allow for re-entering the market. This hardly affects the results and comes with a substantial loss of tractability.
3.3 Initial Participation Stage

The equilibrium definition of the trading stage in Subsection 3.2 starts from a given masses of ATs and LFTs, $m$ and $n$, respectively. However, with fixed participation cost parameters $C_A$ and $C_L$, participation may not be optimal for any masses of ATs and LFTs. Therefore, as highlighted in the setup, the model starts off with a pre-game participation stage which allows to solve for the equilibrium participation masses, $m^*$ and $n^*$. This derivation of these participation masses is relatively straightforward. As there is a market with perfectly competitive entry, ex-ante expected equilibrium profits will mostly equal zero. Hence, we need to find $m^*$ and $n^*$ such that for both player types marginal utility of extra participation is positive but as close to zero as possible, or that the lower bound of zero is attained:

$$n^* = \begin{cases} 
0 & \text{if } E(\sum \Pi_{LFT}(R^*_{LFT}(\hat{a}), \hat{a})|m^*, n) < C_L \forall n, \\
\arg\min_n E(\sum \Pi_{LFT}(R^*_{LFT}(\hat{a}), \hat{a})|m^*, n) - C_L \geq 0 & \text{otherwise}. 
\end{cases} \tag{2}$$

and similarly

$$m^* = \begin{cases} 
0 & \text{if } E(\sum \Pi_{LFT}(R^*_{LFT}(\hat{a}), \hat{a})|m, n^*) < C_A \forall m, \\
\arg\min_m E(\sum \Pi_{LFT}(R^*_{LFT}(\hat{a}), \hat{a})|m, n^*) - C_A \geq 0 & \text{otherwise}. 
\end{cases} \tag{3}$$

4 Quote Dynamics and Trading Costs in Equilibrium

In this section, we characterize the equilibrium order placement strategies for cases with (i) LFTs and fast, but equally uninformed ATs, (ii) LFTs and smart, but slow ATs, and (iii) LFTs and smart and fast ATs (i.e HFTs). However, we first derive equilibrium strategies for what we call the uninformed trading case where the informed state of nature never materializes. The uninformed case is illustrative for our model setup and an important building block for our more general case with informed trading. Moreover, one can show that the equilibrium with fast ATs in the presence of informed liquidity demanders can be derived from a simple transformation of the uninformed case. Next, we develop the informed trading case. To maintain tractability, we look at an informed case with certain parameter restrictions.\(^{18}\) The main features and trade-offs put forward in this paper will largely extend to the unrestricted version of the informed case.

\(^{18}\)A general informed case can be derived but has very low tractability.
4.1 Uninformed Trading Case

The uninformed case is characterized in the model by setting $\bar{\pi} = 0$. This parameter restriction is maintained throughout Subsection 4.1. As divergences in information processing capacities do not matter in this uninformed case, we can abstract from the information sets $\psi_k$. In the trading stage of the uninformed case, having one AT is equivalent to having $\gamma$ LFTs.

As we will see later, if $m$ and $n$ endogenous, the most cost efficient type of liquidity provider will dominate the whole market. As the uninformed case is a building block for the restricted informed case where LFTs and ATs can co-exist, we derive optimal strategies for LFTs and ATs when they compete with one another.

4.1.1 Equilibrium Strategies

Consider a time $\tau$ (assumed earlier than the time of arrival of the uninformed market order) at which a trader $k$ arrives to the market. The standing best price in the market upon arrival $\hat{a}(\tau)$ is strictly above $p(1)$. As submitted limit orders expire upon being undercut, joining the queue at the standing best quote or reverting to a backlying quote upon arrival yields this trader a zero execution probability, and thus zero profit. In contrast, undercutting to the competitive quote $p(1)$ yields a positive expected profit of $(p(1) - \mu)$ with certainty. As such, queue-joining or reverting strategies are always strictly dominated by an undercutting strategy in terms of expected payoffs, and hence will never be played. Furthermore, as traders are atomistic, there is a zero probability of arriving in the market again and observe a self submitted standing best quote.

In case the standing best price in the market upon arrival $\hat{a}(\tau)$ equals $p(1)$, the competitive price is reached. This implies that it is no longer possible to play a profitable undercutting strategy. We assume arriving traders observing this quote upon arrival choose to join this best queue. This allows us to establish the following properties of the equilibrium order placement strategies and consequently of the expected equilibrium execution probabilities.

**Lemma 1** (Monotonicity). Consider equilibrium order placement strategies $R^*_{LFT}(\cdot)$ and $R^*_{AT}(\cdot)$ with $\bar{\pi} = 0$. For all parameter values, these functions have the following properties:

- **(P1)** $R^*_k(\hat{a}(\tau)) < \hat{a}(\tau)$ if $\hat{a}(\tau) \geq p(2)$; and
- **(P2)** $R^*_k(p(1)) = p(1)$.

As a result, the expected execution probability of a limit order undercutting the standing best quote $\hat{a}(\tau)$ is derived as follows:
• for limit orders undercutting to a quote which is strictly larger than \( p(1) \), submitted by an AT and LFT, respectively, we have

\[
\Phi(R_{AT}^*(\hat{a}(\tau))) = \Phi(R_{LFT}^*(\hat{a}(\tau))) = \frac{\nu_{liq}}{\nu_{liq} + \lambda(\gamma m + n)} \equiv \Phi
\]  

(4)

• for a limit order undercutting to \( p(1) \), we have

\[
\Phi(R_{AT}^*(\hat{a}(\tau))) = \Phi(R_{LFT}^*(\hat{a}(\tau))) = 1.
\]  

(5)

Summarizing, Lemma [1] is important for two reasons. First, \((P1)\) states that in equilibrium, the best ask quote must decrease as long as it is greater than the competitive price \( p(1) \). Undercutting is thus the unique possible evolution for the best ask quote. Second, \((P2)\) claims that, with time priority, the unique focal price is the competitive price.\(^{19}\) These results imply that, for each grid, there necessarily exists a price \( \tilde{p}^* \in (p(1), p_{liq}] \), such that when the best quote reaches \( \tilde{p}^* \), the arriving trader without execution priority finds it optimal to post \( p(1) \) and thus secure execution. The next proposition characterizes the unique price at which the “jump” to the competitive price occurs. It also provides traders’ order placement strategies in equilibrium.

**Proposition 1** (Equilibrium Order Placement Strategies). With time and price priority enforced, any market participant \( k \in \{LFT, AT\} \) follows the following strategy when observing quote \( \hat{a}(\tau) \) upon arrival:

\[
R_k = \begin{cases} 
  p_{liq} & \text{if } \hat{a}(\tau) - g(z) \geq p_{liq} \\
  \hat{a}(\tau) - g(z) & \text{if } p_{liq} > \hat{a}(\tau) - g(z) \geq \tilde{p}^* \\
  p(1) & \text{if } \hat{a}(\tau) - g(z) < \tilde{p}^*
\end{cases}
\]

where

\[
\tilde{p}^* = \left\langle \mu + \frac{g(z)}{2\Phi} \right\rangle^+ = p(1) + \left\lfloor \left\lceil \frac{1 - \Phi}{2\Phi} \right\rceil \right\rceil \cdot g(z)
\]

with \( \lfloor \lceil x \rceil \rfloor \) denoting the greatest integer strictly lower than \( x \).

The intuition for Proposition [1] is as follows. Consider a trader \( k \) arriving in the market at time \( \tau \), observing a standing limit order at quote \( \hat{a}(\tau) \) which is smaller or equal to the incoming market order trader’s reservation price \( p_{liq} \). This trader faces the following trade-off. If she quotes the competitive price, she secures execution and obtains

\(^{19}\)Following Maskin and Tirole (1988), we call a focal price a price \( p \) on the equilibrium path such that \( R_k(p) = p \). If there exists a focal price, once it is reached, the traders keep posting this price until the arrival of the market order.
with certainty a profit equal to $p(1) - \mu = \frac{g(z)}{2}$. If instead she undercuts $\hat{a}(\tau)$ by only one tick, she obtains a larger profit (i.e., $\hat{a}(\tau) - g(z) - \mu$) in case of execution. Yet, she then runs the risk of being undercut by a subsequently arriving trader before the market order has arrived. Hence, the payoff of this limit order accounts for the corresponding execution probability (see Lemma 1). When $\tilde{p}^*$ is reached in the sequential undercutting process, traders switch strategies from tick-by-tick undercutting to quoting $p(1)$ immediately. To get an idea of how the undercutting patterns look like, one could have a look at Figure 1.

Previous empirical literature has found that ATs in general improve market liquidity. Lemma 1 and Proposition 1 provide insight into how ATs improve market liquidity absent information asymmetry. In this setting, more liquidity providers are beneficial for market liquidity for two reasons. First, with more liquidity providers, the arrival frequency of liquidity providers to the market is higher, leading to faster undercutting and therefore lower effective spreads. Second, the increased competition for order flow will also induce more aggressive strategies from liquidity providers, inducing them to jump to $p(1)$ earlier (i.e., higher $\tilde{p}^*$). Both effects are stronger with ATs, because those have a $\gamma \geq 1$.

### 4.1.2 Expected Trading Profits

In order to calculate the equilibrium masses of ATs and LFTs, $m^*$ and $m^*$, respectively, we need to calculate the expected profit densities $E(\sum_{\hat{a}} \Pi_{AT}(R_{AT}^*(\hat{a})))$ and $E(\sum_{\hat{a}} \Pi_{LFT}(R_{LFT}^*(\hat{a})))$. If, conditional on $m$ and $n$, the strategies $R_{AT}^*$ and $R_{LFT}^*$ are played, we can distinguish two regions along the equilibrium path. In the first region from $p_{liq}$ down to $\tilde{p}^*$ inclusive, denoted “UC”, both ATs and LFTs undercut the standing best quote tick-by-tick when upon arrival to the market. In the second region, denoted “comp”, each liquidity provider that accesses the market will post a quote at $p(1)$. Figure 1 depicts these two regions graphically.

Next, let us first define $\tilde{\lambda} = (n + \gamma m) \lambda$, the overall arrival intensity of liquidity providers. Moreover, let us define $Z$ as the number of ticks from $p_{liq}$ up to $\tilde{p}^*$ inclusive. Proposition 2 then presents the unconditional expected profits for both trader types.

**Proposition 2** For an LFT and an AT, the unconditional expected profit densities are
given by, respectively

\[
E \left( \sum_{\hat{a}} \Pi_{AT}(R_{LFT}(\hat{a})) \right) = (1 - f_{LFT})m^{-1}(E(\Pi^{UC} + \Pi^{comp}), \tag{6}
\]

\[
E \left( \sum_{\hat{a}} \Pi_{LFT}(R_{LFT}(\hat{a})) \right) = f_{LFT}n^{-1}(E(\Pi^{UC} + \Pi^{comp}), \tag{7}
\]

where

\[
E(\Pi^{UC}) = \sum_{i=0}^{Z} \frac{\nu_{iq}\bar{\lambda}^i}{(\nu_{iq} + \lambda)^{i+1}}(p_{iq} - i \cdot g(z) - \mu), \tag{8}
\]

\[
E(\Pi^{comp}) = (1 - P_{UC})(p(1) - \mu). \tag{9}
\]

\[
P_{UC} = \sum_{i=0}^{Z} \frac{\nu_{iq}\bar{\lambda}^i}{(\nu_{iq} + \lambda)^{i+1}}, \tag{10}
\]

\[
f_{LFT} = \frac{n}{n + \gamma m}. \tag{11}
\]

**Proof.** See appendix. ■

The interpretation of the expressions in Proposition 2 is as follows. ATs and LFTs share in the aggregate expected surplus according to their relative presence in the market given by \( f_{LFT} \). The aggregate expected profits in the UC region is given by the probability weighted average trading profit at each tick in this range (where weights can sum to less than one). The aggregate expected profit in the comp region is given by the probability of reaching it times the guaranteed profit of half a tick.

With the expressions in Proposition 2 we can look for the equilibrium number of ATs and LFTs. As expected profits for both LFTs and ATs are monotonically decreasing in \( m \) and \( n \), it is always possible to find an equilibrium with a strictly positive mass of at least one type of liquidity providers.

The results derived above for the case without information asymmetry are in fact rather straightforward. In essence, what is happening is that we have a competitive market with free entry, such that prices in equilibrium will equal production costs of the most efficient producer of liquidity provision services. We have that the cost per unit of speed (i.e. \( \frac{\gamma}{C_A} \) vis a vis \( \frac{\gamma}{C_L} \)) determines whether the market for liquidity provision in a particular asset is dominated by ATs or LFTs. If \( \frac{\gamma}{C_A} > \frac{1}{C_L} \) we will only have ATs in equilibrium and if \( \frac{\gamma}{C_A} < \frac{1}{C_L} \), we only have LFTs. Hence, absent of information asymmetry, liquidity is fully provided by the liquidity providers that are most efficient in doing so.

**Proposition 3** In the uninformed case, liquidity provision is conducted in equilibrium by ATs when \( \frac{\gamma}{C_A} \geq \frac{1}{C_L} \) and by LFTs otherwise.
Proof. See appendix. ■

4.1.3 Market liquidity

The liquidity of the market is surprisingly easy to calculate once we have \( n^* \) and \( m^* \). The average effective half-spread \( E(\text{spread}) \) is given by the difference between the expected transaction price and the fundamental value \( \mu \). This difference also equals \( E(\Pi^{UC} + \Pi^{comp}) \). Because entry is free, economic profits to all players must equal zero and hence, we must have that

\[
E(\text{spread}) = E(\Pi^{UC} + \Pi^{comp}) = C_A m^* + C_L n^*.
\] (12)

4.2 Informed Trading Case

In this subsection, we work out the model with information asymmetry. In the previous section, the market would be dominated by either ATs or LFTs, depending on the cost of speed. In the setting with information asymmetry, we can have that LFTs and ATs both participate in equilibrium. Smart and HFT ATs have the benefit that they can process information better than LFTs. This allows them to forward toxic order flow to LFTs, hence draining LFT profits and increasing their own. However, this information superiority can lead to a lemons problem that results in costly market freezes. The possibility of such market freezes can form entry barriers for ATs. As a result, equilibria are possible with both LFTs and ATs.

To facilitate exposition and tractability, we assume extreme impatience on the behalf of the informed liquidity demanders. This setting delivers the main results in an easy and tractable way. The model can be extended to allow for more patient informed liquidity demanders, at the expense of reduced tractability and increased notational complexity. The main results will be largely unaffected.

4.2.1 The model with extremely impatient informed liquidity demanders

From this section onwards we assume that informed liquidity demanders are infinitely impatient, that is \( \nu_{inf} = \infty \). One could think about this assumption as having a large informed trader that has a substantial volume to trade and sequentially splits this in smaller blocks (as for instance documented in Admati and Pfleiderer (1988)). The informed trader will monitor the market constantly in order to push through the volume as quickly as possible (for example because information may be perishable). The main advantage to this way of modeling is that informed trading is immediately disclosed as soon as a limit order is put into the book. This makes the inference for LFTs that arrive to a non-empty order book trivial: there is no informed trading. Therefore, if a quote survives, the trading game reduces immediately to the uninformed case. Hence, it is
sufficient to solve for the opening bid of the trading game only. As all uncertainty in the restricted case is resolved right at the beginning of the stage game, all time arguments $\tau$ are redundant and are dropped in this section for notational convenience.

In itself, this restricted version of the model is sufficient to illustrate the main insight of the paper, namely the emergence of market freezes accompanying increases in activity of smart ATs and in particular HFTs. Moreover, if quote cancelations are impossible in a more general version of the model, complete market freezes in the general model can only occur at the beginning of the undercutting sequence, as is also the case in the stylized version of the model. In that case, the main difference between the stylized and the general model would be that the undercutting speed in the general model would be lower, but that posting the first quote of the sequence would be less risky.

Below, we show how under this impatience assumption, the equilibrium with fast ATs is equivalent to the uninformed case with a parameter transformation. Next, we develop trading equilibria in the presence of smart and HFT ATs.

### 4.2.2 Only speed matters: equilibria with fast ATs

The uninformed case is easy to derive and offers high tractability. However, to do a full comparison among the different settings with the different types of ATs, we need to have a setting with fast ATs and informed trading. In this section, we show that under mild conditions the equilibrium with fast ATs can easily be obtained from the uninformed case. To see this, one should realize that informed trading generates unavoidable losses for ATs and LFTs alike, since none of them can use any conditioning information. Therefore, these expected losses when entering an opening quote in the book can be considered as exogenous as long as those do not exceed the expected profits from providing liquidity to uninformed liquidity demanders. Therefore, the expected losses (and somewhat lower expected income) can be seen as an additional fixed cost. Hence, quote posting strategies are identical to those in the uninformed case. The only difference is in the participation stage, where participation is more costly. Therefore, the equilibrium strategies must be the same as the equilibrium strategies arising from the uninformed case with the following modifications to participation cost densities:

$$\tilde{C}_L = \frac{C_L + \bar{\pi} \frac{1}{\bar{n} + \gamma m} (\mu_{inf} - p_{liq})}{1 - \bar{\pi}}, \quad \tilde{C}_A = \frac{C_A + \bar{\pi} \frac{\gamma}{\bar{n} + \gamma m} (\mu_{inf} - p_{liq})}{1 - \bar{\pi}}. \quad (13)$$

### 4.2.3 Information processing matters: equilibria with smart and HFT ATs

For the remainder of this section, we will refer to smart and HFT advanced traders as ATs with $\gamma = 1$ and $\gamma > 1$ respectively.

---

20If quotes are not cancelable, a standing best quote can survive in the book for very long when informed trading suspicions are high, but it cannot disappear. Hence, the only way to have a freeze is to not have a quote posted in the first place.
Because of heterogeneity in information processing, ATs may leave so much toxic informed order flow to LFTs that LFTs become unwilling to participate upon observing an empty book. If informed trading suspicions among ATs are high as well, no party may be willing to offer liquidity and we can get a market freeze. This is very similar to a traditional lemons problem. However, these freezes are costly for ATs, which may give ATs an incentive to avoid those at all. We start by deriving optimal quote posting strategies for ATs and LFTs.

4.2.4 Adding a Quote to an Empty Book

When an AT arrives to an empty book, it will only add a quote $p_{liq}$ when the expected profits from posting an initial quote outweigh the expected losses from doing so. Expected freeze losses do not contribute to this decision, as those are infinitely small, whereas adverse selection losses can be substantial. Therefore, it is optimal to post an initial quote when expected gains of providing liquidity to uninformed order flow exceed expected losses due to liquidity provision to informed order flow:

$$(p_{liq} - \mu)\hat{P}(\zeta = liq|\psi_{AT})\Phi(\zeta = liq) \geq (\mu_{inf} - p_{liq})\hat{P}(\zeta = inf|\psi_{AT})\Phi(\zeta = inf), \quad (14)$$

where $\hat{P}(\zeta = inf|\psi_{AT})$ and $\hat{P}(\zeta = liq|\psi_{AT})$ are the posterior probabilities for the AT of having an informed or uninformed trader as the first liquidity demander to come to the market, respectively. We have that

$$\hat{P}(\zeta = inf|\psi_{AT}) = \begin{cases} \phi_2 & \text{if } s = inf, \\ 1 - \phi_1 & \text{if } s = liq. \end{cases}$$

The execution probabilities are also completely defined, because in the case of informed trading execution is guaranteed and immediate, while in the case of uninformed trading, the game reduces after the first stage to the uninformed trading game. Hence, we have

$$\Phi(\zeta = inf) = 1, \quad \Phi(\zeta = liq) = \Phi. \quad (15)$$

Substituting these expressions into (14) and rewriting tells us that an AT will never post a quote to an empty book at all if

$$1 < \left( \frac{\mu_{inf} - p_{liq}}{(p_{liq} - \mu)\Phi} + 1 \right) (1 - \phi_1).$$

An AT will never post a limit order in an empty book following a signal $s = inf$ if

18
\[ 1 < \left( \frac{\mu_{inf} - p_{liq}}{(p_{liq} - \mu)\Phi} + 1 \right) \phi_2. \]

In the other cases (i.e. if \( \mu_{inf} \) is very small or following a signal \( s = liq \)), it is optimal for an AT to post a first quote \( p_{liq} \).

For the LFT, there is a similar profitability condition to be met. In order to post a quote to an empty book expected gains from liquidity provision to uninformed order flow must exceed expected cost from providing liquidity to informed order flow:

\[
(p_{liq} - \mu)\hat{P}(\zeta = liq|\psi_{LFT})\Phi(\zeta = liq) \geq (\mu_{inf} - p_{liq})\hat{P}(\zeta = inf|\psi_{LFT})\Phi(\zeta = inf), \tag{16}
\]

Naturally, this inequality is more likely to be violated when the posterior probability of informed trading is larger, informed trading losses are larger, uninformed trading gains are lower and uninformed trading execution probabilities are lower.

**Proposition 4** LFTs leave the market when informed trading losses are large, uninformed trading gains are low, uninformed trading execution probabilities are low and the posterior probability of informed trading conditional on arrival to an empty order book is high. This posterior probability is increasing in \( m, \gamma, \phi_2 \), and ATs conditioning on information and decreasing in \( n \) and \( \bar{\pi} \).

## 5 Profitability, Participation and Market Failure

Having established optimal strategies of the different players in this economy, we can analyze the benefit of having market participants with advanced technology available. In line with previous literature, we find that the availability of speed technology by itself is good. If it is inefficient (i.e. too expensive), it will not be adopted and vice versa. Competition among liquidity providers assures that the lower costs of providing liquidity benefits society as a whole in the form of more liquid markets.

**Proposition 5** If LFTs can only choose to adopt speed technology, the availability of this technology never reduces market quality. If it is efficient enough, it takes over the whole market and improves market liquidity.

**Proof.** See Appendix. \( \blacksquare \)

The availability of information processing technology on the other hand can trigger severe information asymmetry problems. However, in the case of smart ATs (i.e. ATs that are equally fast as LFTs, but have superior information processing technology), these effects can be expected to be only mildly damaging. The reason is that the informational advantage is limited to the opening of the book only, as \( \nu_{inf} = \infty \). In all
subsequent undercuttings, ATs compete on an equal basis with LFTs. Hence, ATs need to generate enough profit from the book opening to justify their additional investment. This is only possible when no freeze arises, as freezes do not generate any profit for ATs in expectation. This means that the maximum number of smart ATs in this economy is limited. As information asymmetry without freezes leads to a zero-sum distribution of trading profits, but comes with a higher initial investment, the total mass of liquidity providers (i.e. \( m+n \)) must drop. Moreover, in the opening of the book, undercutting on average goes slower because smart ATs do not always participate. Finally, the requirement for sufficient LFT participation creates an entry barrier for ATs. As a result, ATs can in this setting earn strictly positive profits in expectation, even after accounting for participation costs. As a consequence, market liquidity and price discovery must decline.

**Proposition 6** If LFTs can choose to become smart ATs, the availability of information processing technology is never liquidity enhancing. The mass of LFTs that convert is limited and freezes do not occur in equilibrium.

**Proof.** See Appendix.

For HFT ATs, information processing technology and speed always come together and effects on market-quality are less clear-cut. If speed technology is inefficient, cross-subsidization from information processing technology can still lead to the implementation of this technology for a limited number of market participants. Hence, market liquidity is reduced compared to the setting with fast ATs. Compared to the setting with smart ATs, the effect is less clear-cut. The higher speed makes a given investment contribute more to market liquidity than when \( \gamma \) equals 1. However, this also increases the adoption rate, which is inefficient. In this setting, following the same intuition as before with smart ATs, market freezes cannot occur.

**Proposition 7** The option for LFTs to become HFT ATs is never liquidity enhancing if the speed technology is inefficient. The mass of LFTs that convert in this case is limited and freezes do not occur in equilibrium.

**Proof.** See Appendix.

When speed technology is efficient enough, interesting situations can arise. From Proposition 5 we know that in this case, market-wide implementation of speed technology would be most efficient. However, this would most likely lead to market freezes as no LFTs would be present to keep markets going in the presence of informed trading. As those freezes are costly for ATs, they would under-invest in the implementation of new technology. Hence, the pairing of information processing and speed again lead to sub-optimal outcomes. This inefficiency can come in two forms. When expected freeze
costs are high, HFT entry will be limited in order to retain LFTs and prevent freezes. This scenario is similar to the presence of smart ATs. When expected freeze costs are limited and efficiency benefits are large, HFTs will take over the market, but occasionally freezes will occur. Because the expected freeze costs are anticipated, the mass of HFTs will be smaller than in the absence of information processing technology. As a consequence, average liquidity will improve, but not as much as it could.

**Proposition 8** Let us assume that LFTs have the option to become HFT ATs and that the speed technology is efficient. Either of two possibilities materializes. If freeze costs are relatively large compared to adverse selection losses and/or speed technology is only marginally more efficient, no freezes occur, but technology adoption is sub-optimal as in Proposition 6. Otherwise, costly freezes occur and sub-optimal implementation levels arise.

**Proof.** See Appendix.

### 6 Extensions and Practical Considerations

#### 6.1 Unfreezing Markets and Rationality of Liquidity Demanders

One of the main causes of the market freezes in the presence of HFTs is that in the model uninformed liquidity demanders do not update their reservation values during market failures. After all, if $p_{\text{liq}}$ were to adjusts upwards while $\mu_{\text{inf}}$ stays constant, expected losses due to providing liquidity to informed traders go down, while expected gains from providing liquidity to uninformed order flow go up. Hence, we can let markets unfreeze by letting $p_{\text{liq}}$ increase after a while.

Would it be reasonable for this to happen in practice? We argue that it is. After all, the uninformed liquidity demanders depend on transaction prices for their information to base their reservation prices on. When markets freeze, the last information available to them would imply a value of $\mu$. Only after a while, they might realize that the market has not moved for a long time and rationally increase their reservation value. After all, there is a relatively larger (posterior) probability of a higher valuation then.

For informed liquidity demanders it would also be optimal to increase reservation values in similar fashion to those of the uninformed liquidity demanders. First, this way they keep mimicking the uninformed liquidity demanders and make inference harder. Second, after a while, it is likely that information would start to perish. In a frozen market, the probability of capitalizing on information is very small. Therefore, informed liquidity demanders would after a while be willing to settle for lower informed trading losses.
6.2 A dynamic setting

So far, the information production technology has been exogenously given. If one extends the model to a fully dynamic model, then information production can be made explicit and endogenized in the model. To this end, let us consider an infinitely repeated version of our trading game. In every stage game $l$, a state of nature $\zeta_l$ is drawn according to a Markov Switching process with transition matrix

$$
\begin{pmatrix}
\alpha & 1 - \alpha \\
1 - \beta & \beta
\end{pmatrix},
$$

where $\alpha$ and $\beta$ denote the probabilities of continued liquidity trading and continued informed trading, respectively. In turn, $1 - \alpha$ and $1 - \beta$ denote the switching probabilities from liquidity to informed and from informed to liquidity trading, respectively.

Unconditional steady state probabilities are then given by $\bar{\pi} = \frac{1 - \alpha}{2 - \beta - \alpha}$ and $1 - \bar{\pi} = \frac{1 - \beta}{2 - \beta - \alpha}$.

This setup allows to capture the clustering of informed trades as further documented below.

We now assume that informed order flow is less patient than uninformed order flow (i.e. $\nu_{inf} > \nu_{liq}$) and that smart and HFT ATs can perfectly observe the historical evolution of the order book.

The difference in patience between informed and uninformed liquidity demanders allows for inference about trading types in previous periods by ATs. This information is particularly useful when $\beta \neq 1 - \alpha$, because information about the previous liquidity-demanding trader type will then help to better forecast the current trader type. In particular, when $\nu_{inf} = \infty$, ATs can perfectly infer the state of nature of the previous stage game. In that case, we get a perfect Bayesian equilibrium. The signal accuracy parameters are then given by

$$
\phi_1 = \alpha, \quad \phi_2 = \beta.
$$

Without additional constraints on the price process, the dynamic setting with endogenous learning may not be internally consistent. After all, there is no guarantee that informed traders indeed realize superior profits when trading on their information. The additional constraints required on public information releases and price processes required for internal consistency are described in Appendix B.

---

21Informed trade clustering may for instance arise because at some times there is more private information available than at others, or because a single informed trader slices his trading volume into smaller trades and feeds them consecutively to the market (see e.g. Admati and Pfleiderer (1988)).
6.3 Possibility of Dual Roles in Limit Order Markets

One of the features that crucially characterize a limit order market is that participants can trade either using limit orders or using market orders. In our setting, the freezes can arise because LFTs start to exit the market. If LFTs provide liquidity in a direction they would want to trade to begin with (for example to generate extra revenues and save transaction costs), the dual role makes freezes only more likely. After all, while revenues from liquidity provision deteriorate, the alternative of using market orders to conduct their planned trades becomes cheaper due to more intensive HFT competition. In turn, the increase in (uninformed) liquidity demanders would attract even more HFTs and lower the relative frequency of informed liquidity demand.

7 Effectiveness of HFT Regulatory Measures

In the previous section, we have shown that liquidity provision by HFTs can lead to market freezes, mainly as a result of a lack of liquidity providers willing to absorb potentially toxic order flow. Several measures have been introduced or suggested recently for regulators to get more grip on HFTs. These include

- Transaction taxes,
- Latency restrictions,
- Make-take fees,
- Affirmative liquidity provision.

The framework introduced here helps to analyze the effectiveness of each of those proposals.

First, let us have a look at transaction taxes. Obviously, if transaction taxes are only levied on HFTs, as is the case in some proposals. Imposing an exogenous unavoidable transaction tax would be equivalent to having a larger participation cost. Therefore, the cost of being an HFT goes up and being fast may not be efficient anymore. Hence, it is possible that we move from the setting described in Proposition 8 to the one in Proposition 7 and instead of freezes, we get inefficient adoption of speed technology. It is also possible that the larger costs do not make HFTs inefficient, but merely limit the cross-subsidization from speed to freezes and hence helps to avoid freezes by leaving market share to LFTs. Even if transaction taxes are uniformly applied, HFTs will suffer relatively more if speed technology is efficient. To see this, one should realize that the relative increase in costs is higher for HFTs than LFTs as before taxes, HFT costs per unit of speed are lower (and tax costs add linearly). As a final note, one should realize
that liquidity is bound to go down due to two effects. First, the competitive price $p(1)$ will not be quoted anymore as it is very likely to be loss-making in the presence of transaction taxes. Hence, the taxes will at least partially be forwarded to liquidity demanders. Second, as gains from trade are lower, there is less surplus that liquidity providers can capture and therefore, the funds available to invest in liquidity providing facilities is reduced. As a result, undercutting slows down and average spreads increase.

Second, policymakers have suggested to impose latency restrictions on HFTs. Depending on the exact form these latency restrictions take, HFTs could become more like smart ATs. Benefits from superior speed would in that case disappear, but so would the costly market freezes (assuming speed technology is efficient before latency restrictions are introduced).

Third, several exchanges by now have introduced make-take fees as an incentive scheme for liquidity providers to provide liquidity. In our model, static make-take fees would resort little effect. Such fees would lower the reservation prices of liquidity providers, but also allow liquidity providers to continue undercutting to levels even below the fundamental value $\mu$. Hence, static fees would merely resort a level-shift rather than substantially different behavior from market participants. One could however introduce a ‘dynamic make-take fee’ that becomes particularly high when markets freeze or become very illiquid. This on average would be a tax on informed trading to benefit liquidity provision. As a consequence, expected informed trading losses are reduced ($p_{liq}$ in the model is effectively increased) and liquidity providers are more quickly inclined to re-launch markets again.

Finally, we can have a look at affirmative liquidity provision. Affirmative liquidity provision in its strictest sense means that a liquidity provider is forced to provide liquidity at all times. However, in reality this is unrealistic. In extreme market circumstances, liquidity providers will simply refuse to provide liquidity to avoid ‘catching a falling knife’. A more realistic version is that the failure to provide liquidity to the market at reasonable spreads would be met with fines.\(^{22}\) Such a situation is incorporated in our model. The freeze cost parameter $c_M$ would now also account for the severity of such fines. As $c_M$ increases, being in a freeze becomes more expensive, which creates an incentive to reduce HFT entry, keep LFTs in the market and avoid freezes altogether. Hence, affirmative liquidity provision can help to avoid the most damaging market impact of HFTs on market liquidity. Further gains can be made if the proceeds of these fines are used to subsidize liquidity provision in a freeze as with the dynamic make fees.\(^{23}\)

\(^{22}\)Note that this type of affirmative liquidity provision was also practiced in the past with the NYSE specialist.

\(^{23}\)The main practical difficulty may be that, when affirmative liquidity provision is introduced on a market, HFTs and the majority of the trading may move to less regulated venues. Therefore, in order for this approach to be effective it is crucial that such legislation is introduced in a coordinated way.
8 Conclusion

In this paper, we analyze the consequences of the emergence of high-frequency traders (HFTs), complementing or replacing the traditional liquidity providers on financial markets. Our framework of analysis is a dynamic limit order book model in which HFTs compete for incoming uninformed and informed order flow with low-frequency traders (LFTs), such as traditional market makers or institutional investors. HFTs are modeled to be superior over LFTs in two dimensions (which correspond to practice). First, HFTs have a speed advantage, enabling them to submit limit orders at higher frequencies than LFTs. Secondly, only HFTs possess the information-processing technology to make real-time inferences on “hard information” (such as transaction times).

Our findings indicate that an increase in the number/speed of HFTs improves market liquidity in the absence or with low levels of informed trading, which is in line with the early empirical literature on HFTs. Yet, the synergy between the speed and the information-processing technologies which is naturally inherent to HFTs, can make market liquidity less stable over time. Interestingly, it is speed superiority, the feature that has the largest potential benefit for improving market liquidity, that amplifies asymmetric information problems to the point where markets stop functioning when suspicions of informed trading are high. As such, HFTs can trigger periods of market failure that could not take place when market participants were only fast or possessed only superior information processing technology. Only LFTs could keep the market going, yet they have been largely pushed out of the market for liquidity provision. As such, our model captures the potential systemic risk HFT activity brings to financial markets. Temporary market freezes could arise with increasing frequency in equilibrium as HFTs gain a larger market share and get access to more efficient technology. Our framework also allows to verify the effectiveness of several proposed (or implemented) regulatory measures to manage HFT activity in practice (such as financial transaction taxes, minimum latency requirements, make-take fees, and affirmative liquidity provisions).

The selection of the starting point of our investigation (i.e., how the HFT emergence affects liquidity provision by traditional market makers or institutional investors) is driven by the general concern that HFTs are consistently front-running slower LFTs. The LFTs are thus forced to also make costly investments to lower their latency and improve their information-processing capacity, or move out of the market for liquidity provision as evidenced by our model. In a broader perspective, and beyond the specific scope of our model, in itself this may entail other repercussions for market stability in the short run. In particular, during periods of market stress, long-term institutional investors typically function as market stabilizers withstanding short-term volatility, and the business model of traditional market makers allows easier cross-subsidization be-
tween periods of calm and stress. HFTs on the other hand, are reluctant to carry risky inventory positions for longer than some minutes as they are thinly-capitalized (Kirilenko, Kyle, Samadi and Tuzun, 2011). Moreover, they have no affirmative obligation to make markets over time and tend to retract in bad times as evidenced by the flash crash (CFTC-SEC, 2010).\textsuperscript{24} Furthermore, in the long run, LFTs might also experience reduced profitability through other channels, as they are hampered in their portfolio choice and face more systemic risk in the markets. As such, LFTs may be hindered in their role as long-term risk takers in the mobilization of savings (e.g. pension funds dealing with the aging of society) and in the financing of the economy.

\textsuperscript{24}Notably, this is precisely what exacerbated the vicious liquidity spiral during the May 2010 flash crash. After having swallowed an unusually large initial liquidity shock, HFTs were still lacking sufficient demand from fundamental buyers or cross-market arbitrageurs, and started rapidly buying and reselling future contracts to each other. In turn, this created broader contagion effects causing equity markets to instantly dry up.
References


Figure 1: Example of an undercutting path in the uninformed setting

The figure shows an example undercutting path when there is no asymmetric information. The x-axis shows time elapsed since the first quote has been posted, while the y-axis displays price ticks. Blue exposures are HFT exposures while red exposures are LFT exposures.
A APPENDIX - Proofs

Proof of Proposition 1. Consider a grid with a tick size equal to \( g(z) \). From Lemma 1, it follows that undercutting is the only action undertaken in equilibrium by both ATs and LFTs. Undercutting to any quote larger than the incoming market order trader’s reservation price \( p_{liq} \) is easily shown to be sub-optimal as it will always generate a zero payoff. Hence, upon observing a quote strictly larger than \( p_{liq} \) upon arrival, the optimal strategy is to undercut to \( p_{liq} \). As the limit order execution probability \( \Phi \) is independent of the number of ticks with which the undercutting takes place, undercutting to a quote lower than \( p_{liq} \) is always sub-optimal.

If \( p_{liq} \) or a lower quote are observed upon arrival, undercutting by one tick \( g(z) \) or undercutting to \( p(1) \) are the only actions that will be undertaken in equilibrium by both ATs and LFTs. Undercutting by more than one tick to a price which is strictly larger than \( p(1) \) is always sub-optimal as the limit order execution probability \( \Phi \) is independent of the number of ticks with which the undercutting takes place.

Next, let us determine the threshold price at which arriving traders prefer to undercut to \( p(1) \) instead of undercutting by one tick.

First, trader \( k \) faces the following trade-off. If she quotes the competitive price, she secures execution in the running iteration and obtains with certainty a profit equal to \( p(1) - \mu = \frac{g(z)}{2} \). If instead she undercut by only one tick to a price \( p > p(1) \), her expected payoff equals \( \Phi (p - \mu) \) as she will be undercut by the subsequently-arriving liquidity provider. It follows that undercutting by only one tick is the best response if \( \Phi (p - \mu) \geq \frac{g(z)}{2} \), implying that the exact threshold price where this inequality reverses is at \( \tilde{p}^* = \mu + \frac{g(z)}{2\Phi} \).

As a final step, we still need to account for the fact that \( \tilde{p}^* \) may not be positioned on the price grid. To do so, denote the greatest integer strictly lower than \( x \) by \( \lfloor x \rfloor \).

Then,

\[
\tilde{p}^* = \left( \mu + \frac{g(z)}{2\Phi} \right)^+ = p(1) + \left\lfloor 1 - \frac{\Phi}{2\Phi} \right\rfloor g(z),
\]

where \( \tilde{p}^* \) is the smallest price on the grid such that the inequality is satisfied.

Q.e.d. ■

Proof of Proposition 2. We will now work out the unconditional expected profits in each of the two parts along the equilibrium path.

Let us start with region \( UC \). To facilitate exposition, let us define the random variables \( b \) as the number of ticks away from \( p_{liq} \) on which execution takes place, \( q_t \) the number of ticks the best standing quote is away from \( p_{liq} \) and \( t_b \) the time at which execution takes place. The market-wide expected aggregate profit earned in region \( UC \)
is given by

$$E(\Pi^{UC}) = \sum_{i=0}^{Z} P(b = i)(p_{liq} - ig(z) - \mu).$$

The probability of execution $i$ ticks away from $p_{liq}$ can be derived as follows. We have that

$$P(b = i) = \int_{t=0}^{\infty} P(q_t = i)P(t_b > t)\nu_{liq}dt. \tag{18}$$

The probability $P(q_t = i)$ is given by a Poisson distribution with parameter $\bar{\lambda}t$, while $P(t_b > t) = \exp(-\nu_{liq}t)$. Substituting these distribution functions into (18), we get

$$P(b = i) = \int_{t=0}^{\infty} \frac{\nu_{liq}\bar{\lambda}^i}{(\nu_{liq} + \bar{\lambda})^{i+1}} \left[ (\nu_{liq} + \bar{\lambda})^{i+1} \frac{1}{i!} t^i \exp(-\nu_{liq} + \bar{\lambda}t) \right] dt. \tag{19}$$

or

$$P(b = i) = \frac{\nu_{liq}\bar{\lambda}^i}{(\nu_{liq} + \bar{\lambda})^{i+1}}. \tag{20}$$

The part in square brackets can be recognized as the pdf of a Gamma distribution with parameters $(i + 1, \nu_{liq} + \bar{\lambda})$, while all other terms are multiplicative, do not depend on $t$ and can therefore be put in front of the integration. By definition, a pdf integrates to 1 over its support, such that we have

$$P(b = i) = \frac{\nu_{liq}\bar{\lambda}^i}{(\nu_{liq} + \bar{\lambda})^{i+1}}.$$  

Let us now continue with the $\text{comp}$ region. Let us define the probability of execution in the $\text{UC}$ region

$$P_{UC} = \sum_{i=0}^{Z} P(b = i).$$

If execution takes place outside the $\text{UC}$ region, it must take place in the $\text{comp}$ region where execution is guaranteed to the first one posting a quote $p(1)$. Hence,

$$E(\Pi^{comp}) = (1 - P_{UC})(p(1) - \mu) \tag{21}$$

trivially follows.

Now we still need to show how expected aggregate profits accrue to LFTs and ATs. This depends on the expected exposures of both groups. As expected quote life is independent of trader type, the expected exposure of a group depends on how often it can be expected to post an undercutting quote relative to the other group. Hence, the fraction of time that the market is exposed to LFT quotes is given by

$$f_{LFT} = \frac{n}{n + \gamma m}. \tag{22}$$

Q.e.d.
A.1 Proof of Proposition 4

Let us define the event $B$ that a specific LFT arrives to an empty order book, let the event $S$ denote suspicion from the ATs and $NS$ no suspicion from the ATs. Then Bayes rule gives

$$
\hat{P}(\zeta = \text{inf}|\psi_{LFT}) = P(\zeta = \text{inf}|B) = \frac{P(B|\zeta = \text{inf})}{P(B)},
$$

(23)

$$
P(B) = P(B|\zeta = \text{inf}) + P(B|\zeta = \text{liq}),
$$

(24)

$$
P(B|\zeta = \text{inf}) = P(B|\zeta = \text{inf}, S)P(S|\zeta = \text{inf}) + P(B|\zeta = \text{inf}, NS)P(NS|\zeta = \text{inf}),
$$

(25)

$$
P(B|\zeta = \text{liq}) = P(B|\zeta = \text{liq}, S)P(S|\zeta = \text{liq}) + P(B|\zeta = \text{liq}, NS)P(NS|\zeta = \text{liq}),
$$

(26)

$$
P(S|\zeta = \text{inf}) = \frac{P(\zeta = \text{inf}|S)}{P(\zeta = \text{inf})},
$$

(27)

$$
P(S|\zeta = \text{liq}) = \frac{P(\zeta = \text{liq}|S)}{P(\zeta = \text{liq})}.
$$

(28)

Moreover, we have that

$$
P(B|\zeta = \text{inf}, S) = P(B|\zeta = \text{liq}, S) = \frac{1}{n},
$$

$$
P(\zeta = \text{inf}) = P(\zeta = \text{liq}) = \bar{\pi},
$$

(29)

$$
P(\zeta = \text{inf}, S) = P(\zeta = \text{inf}, NS) = P(\zeta = \text{liq}, S) = P(\zeta = \text{liq}, NS) = \frac{1}{n + \gamma m},
$$

$$
P(\zeta = \text{inf}|S) = \phi_2.
$$

(30)

Substituting in, we get

$$
\hat{P}(\zeta = \text{inf}|\psi_{LFT}) = \frac{\phi_2 \frac{1}{n} + (1 - \phi_2) \frac{1}{n + \gamma m}}{\phi_2 \frac{1}{n} + (1 - \phi_2) \frac{1}{n + \gamma m} + \frac{1}{n} \bar{\pi}(1 - \phi_2) + \left(1 - \frac{\bar{\pi}(1 - \phi_2)}{1 - \bar{\pi}}\right)}.
$$

(31)
The partial derivatives (where $\phi_2 > \bar{\pi}$) are given by\(^{25}\):

\[
\begin{align*}
\frac{\partial \hat{P}(\zeta = \inf|\psi|_{\text{LFT}})}{\partial m} &= \frac{n\gamma(1 - \bar{\pi})(\phi_2 - \bar{\pi})}{(2n(-1 + \bar{\pi}) + m\gamma(-\phi_2 + \bar{\pi}(-1 + 2\phi_2)))^2} > 0, \\
\frac{\partial \hat{P}(\zeta = \inf|\psi|_{\text{LFT}})}{\partial \gamma} &= \frac{m\gamma(1 - \bar{\pi})(\phi_2 - \bar{\pi})}{(2n(-1 + \bar{\pi}) + m\gamma(-\phi_2 + \bar{\pi}(-1 + 2\phi_2)))^2} > 0, \\
\frac{\partial \hat{P}(\zeta = \inf|\psi|_{\text{LFT}})}{\partial \phi_2} &= \frac{m\gamma(1 - \bar{\pi})(\phi_2 - \bar{\pi})}{(2n(-1 + \bar{\pi}) + m\gamma(-\phi_2 + \bar{\pi}(-1 + 2\phi_2)))^2} > 0, \\
\frac{\partial \hat{P}(\zeta = \inf|\psi|_{\text{LFT}})}{\partial n} &= \frac{-m\gamma(1 - \bar{\pi})(\phi_2 - \bar{\pi})}{(2n(-1 + \bar{\pi}) + m\gamma(-\phi_2 + \bar{\pi}(-1 + 2\phi_2)))^2} < 0, \\
\frac{\partial \hat{P}(\zeta = \inf|\psi|_{\text{LFT}})}{\partial \bar{\pi}} &= \frac{-m\gamma(1 - \phi_2)(n + m\gamma\phi_2)}{(2n(-1 + \bar{\pi}) + m\gamma(-\phi_2 + \bar{\pi}(-1 + 2\phi_2)))^2} < 0.
\end{align*}
\]

If ATs do not employ a differential strategy upon observing an informed trade (i.e. ATs always or never submit a first quote), LFTs cannot learn anything about the state of the world from observing an empty book and we have that $P(\zeta = \inf|B) = \bar{\pi}$.

A.2 Proof of proposition 5

LFTs and ATs are homogeneous within each type. Moreover, competitive pressure reduces profits for both types, but the least efficient type reaches zero profit sooner. Therefore, either LFTs or ATs take the whole market. If ATs are inefficient, LFTs take the whole market, which is efficient. If ATs are efficient, they take the whole market. At that point, undercutting speed is higher than with only LFTs, otherwise it would be optimal for some LFTs to be in the market. Hence, on average transactions take place at a lower spread and market liquidity is higher.

A.3 Proof of proposition 6

The proof starts from the assumption that $C_A > C_L$, which is rather trivial as otherwise there is hardly any hurdle whatsoever to purchase this technology. As the speed of ATs equals the speed of LFTs, ATs cannot expect to generate superior profits in the $\text{liq}$ states of nature. Hence, the justification for for the incremental fee expenditure must come from forwarding toxic order flow to LFTs. However, as shown in section 4.2.4, LFTs shun an empty order book if expectations of informed trading are too high, leading to freezes. Moreover, because $c_M \geq \phi_2(\mu_{\text{inf}} - p_{\text{liq}})$, benefits from informed trading in expectation are insufficient to justify freeze costs. Therefore, $m$ is limited and sufficient profit opportunities should exist for LFTs at the opening of the book. With regards to market liquidity, we have that ATs are slower to undercut if they suspect informed trading, hence reducing liquidity when $s = \inf$. Moreover, for each AT that enters the

\(^{25}\text{Calculations performed by Mathematica}\)
market, more than one LFT should drop out. The reason is that participation costs for
ATs are higher and in equilibrium AT’s participation costs should equal trading profits.
As additional trading profits are losses to LFTs with a relatively low participation cost,
on aggregate $n + m$ must drop. Hence, the aggregate undercutting intensity also goes
down even in liq states of the world.

A.4 Proof of proposition 7
By assumption, speed technology by itself is cost inefficient. Hence, trading profits
resulting from speed (i.e. all trading profits in the liq states of the world) cannot justify
the higher $C_A$. Hence, the only way to get any market share for ATs is if they can avoid
toxic order flow in inf states of the world and leave it to LFTs. Additional profits can
only be made when LFTs participate in an empty book and hence, freezes cannot occur
in equilibrium.

A.5 Proof of proposition 8
There are only three possible outcomes. LFTs dominate, ATs dominate or LFTs and
ATs co-exist. Because speed technology is most cost-efficient, it is socially optimal to
have ATs dominate the market and not act on their information advantage. However,
as acting on information creates negative externalities for LFTs or other ATs, it is
never optimal for ATs not to act on their information advantage. Let us first show
that LFTs will never dominate. The size of adverse selection losses for LFTs increases
monotonically and continuously in $m$ and are zero for $m = 0$. Moreover, unconditionally
expected gains from trade are strictly positive. Therefore, it follows from Brouwer’s fixed
point theorem that there must be a point $\tilde{m} \in (0, 1]$ at which LFT profits equal zero for
a strictly positive $n$. As speed technology is cost efficient and ATs benefit from informed
trading profits, it is optimal for them to enter. Hence, $m = 0$ can never happen.

Next, it is sufficient to show that the two other scenarios exist. Suppose $\gamma$ is arbi-
trarily large, while $c_M$ is bounded. Expected freeze losses are insufficient to prevent ATs
from entering, driving all LFTs out of the market and inducing freezes. Hence, there are
levels of cost efficiency of speed technology for which ATs will dominate the market. As
expected freeze losses are insufficient to form an entry barrier, ATs compete perfectly
and ex-ante expected profits must equal zero. Because expected freeze losses are strictly
positive, $m^*$ must fall short of the first best outcome.

Alternatively suppose that $\gamma$ exceeds 1 by an arbitrarily small amount. As in Propo-
sition 6, expected freeze losses form a barrier to entry for ATs at the margin where LFTs
consider leaving the market altogether. Hence, ATs and LFTs will co-exist, whereas in
the first best outcome, ATs dominate the market. Hence, this outcome is also sub-
optimal from a social perspective.
## B Internally consistent news announcements

In the dynamic extension of the model, we need to make sure that price movements are consistent with informed trading. In other words, it is important that prices move in the direction of the information in the market when the state of nature switches from $inf$ to $liq$. However, we want to prevent LFTs from learning from price paths to keep tractability. To this end, we assume that public information can be released between iterations. In particular, we assume that information releases always occur if $\zeta_l$ switches from informed to uninformed, such that the efficient price $\mu$ can be updated to the value $\mu_{inf}$ from last period. Moreover, we assume that information from either side of the book is impounded in prices in a similar way such that there is no price drift up or down.\(^{26}\) In order to have that information releases contain no information about $\zeta_l$, certain conditions about the frequencies of public information releases need to be satisfied. Let us define the event $A_l$ as a public information release (announcement) between iteration $l - 1$ and $l$.

**Assumption 1 (Announcement uninformativeness)** When the state of nature switches from $inf$ to $liq$, public information is released (i.e. $P(A_l|\zeta_{l-1} = inf, \zeta_l = liq) = 1$). Moreover, information releases satisfy the following constraint

\[
\beta(1 - \pi)P(A_l|\zeta_l = inf, \zeta_{l-1} = inf) + (1 - \alpha)(1 - \bar{\pi})\left(\frac{1}{\pi} - 1\right)P(A_l|\zeta_l = inf, \zeta_{l-1} = liq) = \\
(1 - \beta)\bar{\pi} + \alpha(1 - \bar{\pi})P(A_l|\zeta_{l-1} = liq, \zeta_l = liq) \tag{38}
\]

Under assumption\(^{[1]}\) we show below that public information releases are uninformative about the state of nature $\zeta_l$. Note that the assumptions in this paragraph are not necessary to obtain our main results, but merely to show that the setup of our model is internally consistent.

In order to have information asymmetry that is consistent with future price movements, we have under assumption\(^{[1]}\) that

\[
P(A_l|\zeta_{l-1} = inf, \zeta_l = liq) = 1.
\]

Moreover, we want the event $A_l$ to be uninformative about the state of nature (to LFTs). This is the case when

\(^{26}\)For tractability reasons, we refrain from also explicitly modeling the other side of the book.
The only thing left to do now is to work out this constraint in terms of public news release probabilities for each type of transition. We can work out $P(A_l | \zeta_l = inf)$ first:

$$P(A_l | \zeta_l = inf) = P(A_l | \zeta_l = inf, \zeta_{l-1} = inf) P(\zeta_{l-1} = inf | \zeta_l = inf) + P(A_l | \zeta_l = inf, \zeta_{l-1} = liq) P(\zeta_{l-1} = liq | \zeta_l = inf).$$

(42)

Applying Bayes rule twice, we have

$$P(\zeta_{l-1} = inf | \zeta_l = inf) = \frac{P(\zeta_l = inf | \zeta_{l-1} = inf) P(\zeta_{l-1} = inf)}{P(\zeta_l = inf)} = \frac{\beta \bar{\pi}}{\bar{\pi}} = \beta,$$

where $\bar{\pi} = \frac{1-\alpha}{2-\beta-\alpha}$, the long-term (unconditional) steady state probability of being in the informed state of nature. Similarly, we have

$$P(\zeta_{l-1} = liq | \zeta_l = inf) = \frac{(1-\alpha)(1-\bar{\pi})}{\bar{\pi}}.$$

Substituting these expressions into (42), we get

$$P(A_l | \zeta_l = inf) = P(A_l | \zeta_l = inf, \zeta_{l-1} = inf) \beta + P(A_l | \zeta_l = inf, \zeta_{l-1} = liq) (1-\alpha) (\frac{1}{\bar{\pi}} - 1).$$

(43)

Similarly, we can work out $P(A_l)$ as

$$P(A_l) = P(A_l | \zeta_{l-1} = inf, \zeta_l = inf) P(\zeta_{l-1} = inf, \zeta_l = inf) + P(A_l | \zeta_{l-1} = inf, \zeta_l = liq) P(\zeta_{l-1} = inf, \zeta_l = liq) + P(A_l | \zeta_{l-1} = liq, \zeta_l = inf) P(\zeta_{l-1} = liq, \zeta_l = inf) + P(A_l | \zeta_{l-1} = liq, \zeta_l = liq) P(\zeta_{l-1} = liq, \zeta_l = liq).$$

(44)
Working out basic statistical identities, we have

\[ P(\zeta_{l-1} = inf, \zeta_l = inf) = P(\zeta_l = inf | \zeta_{l-1} = inf) P(\zeta_{l-1} = inf) = \beta \bar{\pi}, \]

and similarly

\[ \begin{align*}
P(\zeta_{l-1} = inf, \zeta_l = liq) &= (1 - \beta) \bar{\pi}, \\
P(\zeta_{l-1} = liq, \zeta_l = inf) &= (1 - \alpha)(1 - \bar{\pi}), \\
P(\zeta_{l-1} = liq, \zeta_l = liq) &= \alpha(1 - \bar{\pi}).
\end{align*} \quad (45) \]

Substituting everything into (41) and realizing that probabilities must be contained in the unit interval, any set of announcement probabilities satisfying the following set of constraints can be allowed:

\[ \begin{align*}
\beta(1 - \pi)P(A_l | \zeta_l = inf, \zeta_{l-1} = inf) + (1 - \alpha)(1 - \bar{\pi})(1 - \pi) &\left(\frac{1}{\bar{\pi}} - 1\right) P(A_l | \zeta_l = inf, \zeta_{l-1} = liq) = \\
&= (1 - \beta)\bar{\pi} + \alpha(1 - \bar{\pi})P(A_l | \zeta_{l-1} = liq, \zeta_l = liq) \quad (48)
\end{align*} \]

and

\[ \begin{align*}
P(A_l | \zeta_l = inf, \zeta_{l-1} = inf) &\in [0, 1], \\
P(A_l | \zeta_l = inf, \zeta_{l-1} = liq) &\in [0, 1], \\
P(A_l | \zeta_{l-1} = liq, \zeta_l = liq) &\in [0, 1].
\end{align*} \quad (49) \]

(50) \]

(51) \]
# C Notation Summary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Symbol</th>
<th>Support</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$z$</td>
<td>$\mathbb{N}$</td>
<td>grid size</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$Q_z$</td>
<td>$-$</td>
<td>price grid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$g(z)$</td>
<td>$(0, \infty]$</td>
<td>tick size</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$p(i)$</td>
<td>$Q_z$</td>
<td>price level on the grid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\mu$</td>
<td>$(0, \infty]$</td>
<td>fundamental value conditional on public information only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$p_{liq}$</td>
<td>$(\mu, \infty]$</td>
<td>reservation price liquidity demanders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\mu_{inf}$</td>
<td>$(p_{liq}, \infty]$</td>
<td>true value of the asset in the informed state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\hat{a}$</td>
<td>$Q_z$</td>
<td>standing best quote upon arrival</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$C_k$</td>
<td>$(0, \infty]$</td>
<td>participation costs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$c_M$</td>
<td>$[0, \infty]$</td>
<td>freeze costs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\lambda$</td>
<td>$(0, \infty]$</td>
<td>arrival intensity liquidity providers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\gamma$</td>
<td>$[1, \infty]$</td>
<td>speed advantage of ATs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\nu_{inf}, \nu_{liq}$</td>
<td>$[0, \infty]$</td>
<td>arrival intensities for informed and uninformed liquidity demanders respectively</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\phi_1, \phi_2$</td>
<td>$(0.5, 1]$</td>
<td>accuracy of signals $s = liq$ and $s = inf$ respectively</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\bar{\pi}$</td>
<td>$[0, 1]$</td>
<td>(unconditional) probability of $\zeta = inf$ state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\alpha, \beta$</td>
<td>$[0, 1]$</td>
<td>transition probabilities of staying in the $liq$ and $inf$ states respectively</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>States of nature</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$V$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\zeta$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$s$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\psi_k$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indices</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$k$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$i$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$t$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$l$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Decision variables</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$m, n$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$a$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>