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This article informs about the paper 'Does Stock Liquidity Affect Incentives to Monitor? Evidence from Corporate Takeovers' by Roosenboom, Schlingemann and Vasconcelos. They find that there is a tradeoff between monitoring via institutional intervention and liquidity for takeovers of private targets, but not for takeovers of public targets.
This article informs about the paper 'Does Stock Liquidity Affect Incentives to Monitor? Evidence from Corporate Takeovers' by Roosenboom, Schlingemann and Vasconcelos. They find that there is a tradeoff between monitoring via institutional intervention and liquidity for takeovers of private targets, but not for takeovers of public targets.